Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations by David Stern (2004)(review revised 2019) by Starks, Michael
1 
 
 
Review of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 
by David Stern (2004)(review revised 2019) 
 
Michael Starks  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Overall Stern does a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is one of the top W 
scholars, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at 
length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and 
preferably Searle also), then I don't see how one could have more than a 
superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus 
of all complex behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, 
society). In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a 
sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start 
with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum 
considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human 
behavior. 
As Stern is aware, throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by 
possible alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from often 
unedited and handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently 
incorrectly rendered as “proposition” (which is a testable or falsifiable 
statement) when referring to our non-falsifiable psychological axioms, as 
opposed to the correct “sentence”, which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-
only statements such as “these are my hands” or “Tyrannosaurs were large 
carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million years ago”.  
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at 
the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, 
difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to 
miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
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Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
Overall, Stern does a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is one of the top W 
scholars, but in my view, they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at 
length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and 
preferably Searle also) then I don’t see how one could have more than a superficial 
understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex 
behavior (psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society) . In a 
nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in 
the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable 
quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to 
understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
"young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in 
the other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof). The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein 
(PI p.232) 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete 
darkness.” (BBB p18). 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 
94 
“If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and 
reality loses all point. For now, the sentence itself can serve as such a shadow. The 
sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t the slightest similarity with what it 
represents.” BBB p37 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
3 
 
 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in 
an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all 
intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
“Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.”  TLP 5.1361 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
“We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the 
problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no 
questions left, and this itself is the answer.” TLP 6.52 
“Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts.” Z 220 
“Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything…One might give the name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions.” PI 126 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) 
are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest descriptive 
psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that 
philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (DPHOT), 
which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have never 
seen it clearly stated anywhere. 
 
Here is how the leading Wittgenstein scholar summarized his work: 
“Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject 
for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about 
the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought 
and language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of 
other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical 
propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of logic and 
language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights into 
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philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on 
the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He undermined 
foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a 
contribution not to human knowledge, but to human understanding – 
understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual confusions into 
which we are liable to fall.”—Peter Hacker--'Gordon Baker's late interpretation 
of Wittgenstein' 
I would add that W was the first (by 40 years) to clearly and extensively describe 
the two systems of thought -- fast automatic proto-linguistic S1 and the slow 
reflective linguistic dispositional S2. He explained how behavior only is possible 
with a vast inherited background that is the axiomatic basis for judging and 
cannot be doubted or judged. Will (choice), consciousness, self, time and space 
are innate true-only axioms. He discussed many times what is now known as 
Theory of Mind, Framing and cognitive illusions. He frequently explained the 
necessity of the innate background and demonstrated how it generates behavior. 
He described the psychology behind what later became the Wason test--a 
fundamental measure used in EP research decades later. He noted the 
indeterminate nature of language and the game-like nature of social interaction. 
He examined in thousands of pages and hundreds of examples how our inner 
mental experiences are not describable in language, this being possible only for 
public behavior with a public language (the impossibility of private language). 
Thus, he can be viewed as the first evolutionary psychologist. 
When thinking about Wittgenstein, I often recall the comment attributed to 
Cambridge Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like 
him). “Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like not 
offering the chair of physics to Einstein!" I think of him as the Einstein of intuitive 
psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas about 
the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world, 
and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal 
homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early 
version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world 
famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing 
more, and knowledge of his new work, in mostly garbled form, diffused slowly 
from occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind 
over 20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in German, composed of 
sentences or short paragraphs with, often, no clear relationship to sentences 
before or after; that he wrote in a Socratic style with 3 distinct persons in the 
dialog—the narrator, the interlocutor and the commentator (usually W’s view), 
whose comments were blended together by most readers, thus completely 
vitiating the whole elucidatory and therapeutic thrust, that these were cut and 
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pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes in the margins, 
underlinings and crossed out words, so that many sentences have multiple 
variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, leaving 
out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing the 
correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how 
the universe{mind} works and that they then published this material with 
agonizing slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained 
no real explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as 
famous due to many statements that all previous physics{philosophy} was a 
mistake and even nonsense, and that few understood his work well, in spite of 
hundreds of books and tens of thousands of papers discussing it; that many 
physicists{philosophers} knew only his early work in which he had made a 
definitive summation of Newtonian physics {classical philosophy} stated in such 
extremely abstract and condensed form that it was difficult to decide what was 
being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles 
on the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics{philosophy} 
had only passing and usually erroneous references to him, and that many omitted 
him entirely and that to this day, over half a century after his death, there were 
only a handful of people who really grasped the monumental consequences of 
what he had done. This, I claim, is precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
Before remarking on this book, I will first offer some comments on philosophy 
and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the 
works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Baker and Hacker (H), Read etc. al.  It will 
help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, 
Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these geniuses, 
who provide a clear description of higher order behavior not found in psychology 
books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. A major theme in all discussion 
of human behavior is the need to separate the genetically programmed 
automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of higher order behavior is an 
effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking --e.g., perceptions and 
other automatisms vs. dispositions, but the extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior, while the later W shows how it is based on true-only unconscious 
axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of 
S2. 
 
On Certainty was not published until 1969, 18 years after Wittgenstein’s death and 
has only recently begun to draw serious attention. I cannot recall a single reference 
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to it in all of Searle and one see’s whole books on W with barely a mention. There 
are however xlnt books on it by Stroll, Svensson, McGinn and others and parts of 
many other books and articles, but hands down the best is that of Daniele Moyal-
Sharrock (DMS) whose 2004 volume “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty” is mandatory for every educated person, and perhaps the best starting 
point for understanding Wittgenstein (W), psychology, philosophy and life. 
Recently she has produced a half dozen superb articles that show how OC 
revolutionized epistemology by describing how action issues directly from certain 
understandings (hinges) that require no judgements. Also, some excellent work 
has appeared from Coliva and Andy Hamilton. However (in my view) all analysis 
of W falls short of grasping his unique and revolutionary advances by failing to 
put behavior in its broad evolutionary and contemporary scientific context, which 
I will attempt here. 
“What sort of progress is this—the fascinating mystery has been removed--yet no 
depths have been plumbed in consolation; nothing has been explained or 
discovered or reconceived. How tame and uninspiring one might think. But 
perhaps, as Wittgenstein suggests, the virtues of clarity, demystification and truth 
should be found satisfying enough.” Horwich ‘Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy’. 
Horwich also gives there one of the most beautiful summaries of where an 
understanding of Wittgenstein leads us that I have ever seen. 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) 
as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense 
logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or 
Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s 
account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in 
Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more 
complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre 
hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." 
Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
“Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not 
a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is 
no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 
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“The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from 
this can more complicated forms develop. Language--I want to say--is a refinement. 
‘In the beginning was the deed.’” CV p31 
Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior 
and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third and 
final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that all behavior 
is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination 
issues from unconscious automatisms), but the foundation for all description of 
animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The 
“must” is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and 
common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily 
has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved 
psychology based on inclusive fitness, and in humans this is extended into a 
personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to 
manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). This book, and 
arguably all of W’s work and all useful discussion of behavior is a development 
of or variation on these ideas. Another major theme here and of course in all 
discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the effects of culture from 
those of genetics and though few philosophers explicitly discuss this, it can be 
seen as one of the major problems they are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of 
the greatest value to consider W’s work and most of his examples as an effort to 
tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (see below), but nature and nurture. 
In the course of many years reading extensively in W, other philosophers, and 
psychology, it has become clear that what he laid out in his final period (and 
throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of what is now 
known as evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, cognitive psychology, 
cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. 
Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a vast and unique 
textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was 
written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral 
sciences and humanities, and even those few in philosophy who have more or less 
understood him have not carried the analysis to its logical (psychological) 
conclusion nor realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and 
cognitive illusions (the two selves of fast and slow thinking—see below). His heir 
apparent, John Searle, refers to him periodically and his work can be seen as a 
straightforward extension of W’s, but he does not really get that this is what he is 
doing. Other leading W analysts such as Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto and 
Moyal-Sharrock do marvelously but (in my view) stop short of putting him in the 
center of current psychology, where he certainly belongs. I eventually came to 
understand much of W by regarding his corpus as the pioneering effort in EP, 
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seeing that he was describing the two selves and the multifarious language games 
of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd period works and reading 
backwards to the proto-Tractatus. It has been extremely revealing to alternate W 
with the writings of hundreds of other philosophers and evolutionary 
psychologists (as I regard all psychologists and in fact all behavioral scientists, 
cognitive linguists and others). It should also be clear that insofar as they are 
coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior are describing the same phenomena 
and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable 
themes of “Embodied Mind” and “Radical Enactivism” should flow directly from 
and into W’s work. However, few seem able to follow his example of avoiding 
jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even the redoubtable Read and 
Hutto (see below) have to be heavily filtered to see that this is true and even they 
do not get how completely W has anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-
self embodied thinking (acting). 
“People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are 
still occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks… at 
something which no explanation seems capable of clearing up…And what’s 
more, this satisfies a longing for the transcendent, because in so far as people 
think they can see the ‘limits of human understanding’, they believe of course 
that they can see beyond these. - CV (1931) 
“How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and 
about behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. 
We talk about processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime 
perhaps we shall know more about them-we think. But that is just what commits 
us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of 
what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the 
conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite 
innocent). —And now the analogy which was to make us understand our 
thoughts falls to pieces. So, we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in 
the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as though we had denied mental 
processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them.   PI p308 
“Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word ‘pain’ meant-
so that he constantly called different things by that name-but nevertheless used 
the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of the 
word ‘pain’-in short he used it as we all do.” PI p271 
“Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of 
interpretation. It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 
The failure (in my view) of even the best thinkers (with a few possible exceptions) 
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to fully grasp W’s significance is partly due to the limited attention On Certainty 
(OC) and his other 3rd period works have received, but even more to the inability 
to understand how profoundly our view of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, 
linguistics, politics, law, morals, ethics, religion, aesthetics, literature (all of them 
being descriptive psychology), alters once we accept this evolutionary point of 
view. The dead hand of the blank slate view of behavior still rests heavily and is 
the default of the second self of slow thinking conscious system 2, which is 
oblivious to the fact that the groundwork for all behavior lies in the unconscious, 
fast thinking axiomatic structure of system 1 (Searle’s ‘Phenomenological 
Illusion’). Steven Pinker’s brilliant ‘The Blank Slate: the modern denial of human 
nature’ is highly recommended preparation, even though it is now dated and he 
has no clue about Wittgenstein, and hence of what can be regarded as the first and 
best really deep investigation into the foundations of human nature. He seems not 
to grasp that the Blank Slate is an expression of the cognitive illusions that 
constitute our mental life. 
The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker’s books “The Stuff of 
Thought: language as a window into human nature”) that language is a window 
on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be 
some other “Language of Thought” of which it is a translation, were rejected by 
W, who tried to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicuous 
examples of language in action, that language is the best picture we can ever get 
of thinking, the mind and human nature, and his whole corpus can be regarded 
as the development of this idea. He rejected the idea that the Bottom Up 
approaches of physiology, psychology and computation could reveal what his 
Top Down deconstructions of Language Games (LG’s) did. The difficulties he 
noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes and to capture 
vagueness (“The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of 
representing vagueness” LWPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle 
contractions, the principal way we can interact) is not a window into the mind 
but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present 
and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Secondary Language 
Games (SLG’s) of the Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, 
meaning, believing, intending etc.). Some of W’s favorite topics in his later second 
and his third periods are the interdigitating mechanisms of fast and slow thinking 
(system 1 and 2), the irrelevance of our mental life to the functioning of language 
and the impossibility of private language. The bedrock of our behavior is our 
involuntary, system 1, fast thinking, true only, mental states- our perceptions and 
memories and involuntary acts, while the evolutionarily later SLG’s are 
descriptions of voluntary, system 2, slow thinking, testable true or false 
dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, 
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thinking, knowing, believing etc. He recognized that ‘Nothing is Hidden’—i.e., 
our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here 
in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to 
recognize them as always here in front of us—we just have to stop trying to look 
deeper (e.g., “The greatest danger here is wanting observe oneself” LWPP1, 459). 
 
W makes these points throughout his works in countless examples and again his 
whole corpus can be regarded as the effort to make this clear. After all, what exactly 
is the alternative? W showed over and over that standard ways of describing 
behavior (i.e., most of philosophy, and much of descriptive psychology, 
anthropology, sociology, economics, etc.) are either demonstrably false or 
incoherent. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding 
“language philosophy” as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, 
since language is just another name for the mind. And, when W says (as he does 
many times) that understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the progress 
of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion “The confusion and barrenness of 
psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘young science’ --but cf. another 
comment that I have never seen quoted “Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? 
Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten the philosophers task. Imagining 
possibilities.” (LWPP1, 807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but 
pointing out the fact that our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture 
possible of our psychology. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI 
and all the rest are fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic 
psychology, but all they can do is provide the physical basis for our behavior, 
facilitate our analysis of language games, and extend our EP, which remains 
unchanged (unless genetic engineering is unleashed to change our EP—but then it 
won’t be us anymore). The true-only axioms of ‘’On Certainty’’ are W’s (and later 
Searle’s) “bedrock” or “background”, which we now call evolutionary psychology 
(EP), and which is traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria, which 
evolved and operates by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF). See the recent 
works of Trivers and others for a popular intro to IF or Bourke’s superb “Principles 
of Social Evolution” for a pro intro. 
“Thought is surrounded by a halo. Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the 
a priori order of the world: that is the order of possibilities, which must be common 
to both world and thought. But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is 
prior to all experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness 
or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it. It must rather be of the purest crystal. 
But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction; but as something concrete, 
indeed, as the most concrete, as it were, the hardest thing there is. (TLP # 5, 5563, 
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PI 97).” 
“There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) 
what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as from a 
reservoir.” BBB p143 
“And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined to 
make is labeled by the word “to make” as we have used it in the sentence “It is no 
act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do”, because there is an idea that 
“something must make us” do what we do. And this again joins onto the confusion 
between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do. The 
chain of reasons has an end.” BBB p143 
Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical (nontestable) responses to the 
world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further 
true only understandings (“theorems” as we might call them, but of course, like 
many words, this is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two 
hands or our breathing. This totally changes one’s view of human nature.  Theory 
of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-only Understandings of 
Agency (UA a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including 
flies and worms if UA is suitably defined) have and subsequently extend greatly 
(in higher eukaryotes). Likewise, the Theory of Evolution ceased to be a theory 
for any normal, rational, intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and 
for Darwin at least half a century earlier. One cannot help but incorporate T. rex 
and all that is relevant to it into our innate background via the inexorable 
workings of EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this it is 
truly stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most 
basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others). 
And incidentally, the equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential 
to understanding W and human nature (as DMS, but afaik nobody else, points 
out). 
So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension 
of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. 
A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner 
by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain 
of other nonsense) cannot really get a foothold, as “reality” is the result of 
involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable propositional attitudes. 
It is clear to me that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout 
his work, and almost exclusively in OC, are equivalent to the fast thinking or 
System One that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--
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“Thinking Fast and Slow”, but he has no idea W laid out the framework over 50 
years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the 
mental states of perception, emotion and memory, as W notes over and over. One 
might call these “intracerebral reflexes” (maybe 99% of all our cerebration if 
measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less 
“conscious” (beware another network of language games!) second-self brain 
activity corresponds to what W characterized as “dispositions” or “inclinations”, 
which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states, and do not have 
any definite time of occurrence. But disposition words like “knowing”, 
“understanding”, “thinking”, “believing”, which W discussed extensively. 
Disposition words have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical 
use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences 
resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Reflexive 
(CSR)-(called reflexive or intransitive in BBB), and the S2 use, which is their 
normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true 
or false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) 
and are not CSR (called transitive in BBB). The equation of these terms and much 
else here is my idea so don’t expect to find it in the literature. 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, 
economics (e.g., Kahneman’s Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like 
“cognitive illusions”, “priming”, “framing”, “heuristics” and “biases”. 
Of course, these too are language games, so there will be more and less useful 
ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from “pure” 
System One to combinations of One and Two (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System Two dispositional thinking only, since any 
thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of the “cognitive modules”, “inference engines”, “intracerebral reflexes”, 
“automatisms”, “cognitive axioms”, “background” or “bedrock” (as W and later 
Searle call our EP). 
Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is 
epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not describe nor determine how we act 
(speak). It is an obvious corollary of his descriptive psychology that it is the 
unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and 
that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, 
desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne 
out by the latest experimental psychology, which is nicely summarized by 
Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter ‘Two Selves’, but of course there 
is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite). It is an easily defensible view 
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that the generalities of most of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions is 
wholly compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. 
It follows both from W's 3rd period work and from contemporary psychology, 
that `will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of S1 
composed of perceptions and reflexes., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) 
of demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made clear numerous 
times, they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only 
axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 
(often modified into the cultural extensions), which produces reasons for action 
that often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. 
The general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by 
Tooby and Cosmides ` The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2 has generated 
the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, 
but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, i.e., public 
truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in language, there 
aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: 
the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or without words, 
the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion 
(COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and 
fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between 
thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might 
note here that `grammar' in W can usually be translated as EP and that in spite of 
his frequent warnings against theorizing and generalizing, this is about as broad 
a characterization of higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) as one can 
find. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- "Speaker meaning... 
is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" which 
means to speak or write a well-formed sentence expressing COS in a context that 
can be true or false and this is an act and not a mental state. Hence, the famous 
quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to 
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see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole 
problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image 
its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without 
any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." 
the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise 
at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills 
it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been 
satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I 
have learned to talk, then I do know." 
W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics—the Top 
Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples 
of language use in context, exposing the many varieties of language games and 
the relationships between the primary games of true-only unconscious, axiomatic 
fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive emotions and acts (often 
described as the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self 
functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional conscious abilities 
of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional 
secondary language games of slow thinking that include the network of cognitive 
illusions that constitute the basis of our second-self personality. He dissects 
hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories 
and reflexive actions of system one (S1) grade into the thinking, remembering, and 
understanding of system two (S2) dispositions, and many of his examples also 
address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his 
later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current 
and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find 
that this evolutionary two systems view is the best. To paraphrase Dobzhansky’s 
famous comment: “Nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of 
evolutionary psychology.” 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” PI p107 
“Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. --- Not anything 
that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! …. This is connected, I believe, 
with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations.  If we dwell 
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upon it, and do not try to get beyond it.”  Zettel p312-314 
 
“Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations.” BBB p125 
 
“For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply 
means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.” PI p133 
 
One of W’s recurring themes was TOM, or as I prefer UA (Understanding of 
Agency). Ian Apperly, who is carefully analyzing UA1 and UA2 (i.e., UA of S1 and 
S2) in experiments, has recently become aware of Hutto, who has characterized 
UA1 as a fantasy (i.e., no ‘Theory’ nor representation involved in UA1--that being 
reserved for UA2— see my review of his book with Myin). However, like other 
psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this 80 years ago. 
It is an easily defensible view that the core of the burgeoning literature on cognitive 
illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is compatible with and 
straightforwardly deducible from W. In spite of the fact that most of the above has 
been known to many for decades (and even ¾ of a century in the case of some of 
W’s teachings), I have never seen anything approaching an adequate discussion in 
behavioral science texts and commonly there is barely a mention. 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the construction of Social 
Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and I will give some perspective. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 years ago had 
evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions with 
basic utterances that can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s) 
describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious automated System One, true-only 
mental states with a precise time and location). We gradually developed the 
further ability to encompass displacements in space and time to describe 
memories, attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often 
counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) 
with the Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true 
or false propositional attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are 
abilities and not mental states). 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
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Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, 
capacities, hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 p148). “I 
believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically 
displaced in spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only 
(excluding lying) while third person statements about others are true or false (see 
my review of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositions nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., Consciousness and 
Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent mental representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily 
more primitive System One mental states of perceptions memories and reflexive 
actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 and 
System 3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate psychology after 
System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in 
another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination 
supplementing cognition and volition). S1 are potential or unconscious mental 
states (Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or 
primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, no tests 
possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as secondary 
LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me 
in my own case (i.e., how do I know what I believe, think, feel until I act). 
Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted 
out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are 
not Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, Hacker etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology, 
contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems framework, and his work a 
unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and 
its interaction with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably 
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nobody fully to this day) it was further developed by a few --above all by John 
Searle, who made a simpler version of the table below in his classic book 
Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure 
of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and 
so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC 
is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the 
same), cognitive linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought 
(HOT), and in my view the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), and thus in the study of behavior. See my article The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and the recent work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. 
 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Referential--Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible). Emotions evolved to make a bridge between desires or intentions and 
actions. Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking 
conscious Voluntary Abilities--described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit 
the world. 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as 
SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W understood this and 
described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the 
mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to working memory and 
so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior 
(the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions are thoughts 
which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while 
Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA- 
Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind 
direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced 
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in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter 
Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for 
describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other 
framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have 
to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many 
directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being 
bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, 
perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. 
are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations 
of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense S1 such as 
perceptions do not have COS. In other writings S says they do but as noted in my 
other reviews I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 (private presentations) 
and COS2 (public representations). To repeat this critical distinction, public 
Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, 
Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his 
‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive 
or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary 
or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of 
minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about 
brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but 
I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
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(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place 
(H+N, T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule 
Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
 Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates 
or Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention In Action 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****       Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******    (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this causally self- referential. 
*******  Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
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explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, 
reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and 
generally happening in less than 500msec, while System 2 are abilities to perform 
slow deliberative actions that are represented in consciousness (S2D-my 
terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also 
become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness 
from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short 
term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. 
For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than T or F. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.G., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the 
world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are 
independent of general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by 
cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have public 
conditions of satisfaction etc. 
 
There will always be ambiguities because the words cannot precisely match the 
actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial 
explosion of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not 
possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws which would have to 
state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories. 
 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions and some Primary or Primitive Language 
Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, 
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nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, informationless, true-
only mental states with a precise time and location) and over time there evolved in 
higher cortical S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and 
time (conditionals, hypotheticals or fictionals) of potential events (the past and 
future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or 
dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 
slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive(having public 
Conditions of Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide 
into COS1 and COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational—which I again 
divide into R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional 
attitudinal thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities 
and not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic 
Ontological Rules, Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, 
Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, 
Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly developing and 
changing results of S2 dispositions (W RPP2 148) while others are typical S1—fast 
and automatic to appear and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are 
descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in spacetime. My first-person 
statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person 
statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositions nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and 
Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent public representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
C+L p53). 
 
They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily more 
primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. 
This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major advance in vertebrate 
psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ are potential or 
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unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or 
primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True Only. Dispositions can be described as 
secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even 
for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or 
some event occurs—see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the 
Inner’ and Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). Note well that 
Dispositions also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted 
out in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are 
NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his 
work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 
psychology and its interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the 
groundwork for the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue 
and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a 
simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It 
expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology 
developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his 
last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of 
behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics 
or Higher Order Thought, and in my view the single most important work in 
philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of behavior. Perception, 
Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the mind 
automatically fits the world (is Causally Self Reflexive-- Searle) --the 
unquestionable, true only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is 
possible). Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking 
conscious Voluntary Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind 
tries to fit the world.  Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W 
understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of 
examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access 
to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often incorrect reasons to 
explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of current research). 
Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the 
facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to 
act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action--IAA--Searle) plus acts which try 
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to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit— cf. Searle e.g., 
C+L p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions — (believing, 
knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential PUBLIC ACTS 
(language, thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. 
PERCEPTIONS: (“X” is True):  Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
MEMORIES:  Remembering, Dreaming? 
PREFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True): 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, Thinking, 
Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, 
Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), Experiencing, 
Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, expecting, wishing, 
wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming , Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
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Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting(describing, 
teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, 
Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer 
Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and 
Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior. 
 
WORDS EXPRESS POTENTIAL ACTIONS HAVING VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND ARE 
NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF EVENT. 
 The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly 
equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons 
organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to 
the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and then to actions. 
Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these processes or 
only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of 
cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, 
neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as 
the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the modules which 
produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, development and 
individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since the axioms 
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can 
enlarge our understanding by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can 
extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them 
faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as 
conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of 
behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and 
require consciousness, will and self and in normal human adults nearly all except 
perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), 
and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
expected utility--Bayesian utility maximization but Bayesianism is highly 
questionable) via dominance and reciprocal altruism (Desire Independent Reasons 
for Action-Searle- which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and impose 
Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of Satisfaction -Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts 
to the world via public acts ( muscle movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, 
sex, sports etc.). The basics of this were figured out by our greatest natural 
psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
27 
 
 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John 
Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I 
strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf. Z p464. 
Much of intentionality (i.e., of our language games) admits of degrees. As W noted, 
inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, 
concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be 
useful. There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of 
using the dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and 
rational with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of 
S1 and S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere 
phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself 
and thus can play no role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all 
dispositions (inclinations, propositional attitudes) lacks any test, is not a mental 
state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a 
public act in speech, writing or other muscular contractions. Our perceptions and 
memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are 
manifested in public actions, for only then do thinking, feeling etc. have any 
meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
(Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon). Developing language means 
manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. TOM (Theory of Mind) 
is much better called UA-Understanding of Agency –my term-and UA1 and UA2 
for such functions in S1 and S2) –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or 
Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, 
self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting 
muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive 
rational S2D or non-rational automated S2A speech and action.   We see that the 
efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind (thought, 
language) works (as opposed to how the BRAIN works) than we already know, 
because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any 
phenomena that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum 
mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table 
is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and 
chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. 
Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only 
examine carefully the workings of language.  Language (mind, public speech 
connected to potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus 
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the gathering of resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., 
evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions automatically and is extremely 
confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple uses 
depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do I 
believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person 
expressive use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” describe my ability to 
predict my probable acts and are not descriptive of my mental state nor based on 
knowledge or information in the usual sense of those words (W).  It does not 
describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s 
raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs used in first person present 
tense are causally self-referential--they instantiate themselves but as descriptions of 
possible states they are not testable (i.e., not T or F). However past or future tense 
or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ contain 
information that is true or false as they describe public acts that are or can become 
verifiable.  Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no information apart from 
subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s 
raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to 
convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000) Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (Non-Reflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or 
abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahneman). Prior Intentions are stated by Searle 
to be Mental States and hence S1 but again I think one must separate PI1 and PI2 
since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious deliberations of 
S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many 
Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, 
NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, 
algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Some of the leading exponents of W’s ideas whom I consider essential reading for 
an understanding of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought are Hutto, 
DMS, Stern, Finkelstein, Moyal-Sharrock and Read who, unlike many scholars, 
have posted most of their work free online at www.academia.edu and the leading 
W scholar PMS  Hacker http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 
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In OC, as throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative 
and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited and 
handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently incorrectly rendered as 
“proposition” (which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our 
non-falsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct “sentence”, which 
CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as “these are my hands” 
or “Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million 
years ago”. 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the 
center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or 
irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to 
miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
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